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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
THE LIABILITY OF AN OWNER OF A VEHICLE WHEN,
DUE TO HIS NEGLIGENCE, HIS GUEST IS INJURED
BY DANIEL L. BRENNER
A great deal has been written and there has been much dis-
cussion on the question as to whether a third person is liable to
an automobile passenger who is injured by the concurrent negli-
gence of the driver of the automobile and the third person. In
answering this question, we must obviously determine whether
the negligence of the driver can be imputed to his passenger so
as to bar recovery against the third person. Every court, with
the exception of the Michigan courts, has held that if the driver
and his passenger are not engaged in a common or joint enter-
prise, and if the passenger is not guilty of contributory negli-
gence, then the negligence of the driver is not imputable to the
passenger so as to bar recovery against the third person.1
Blashfield 2 says on this point:
"In order that the negligence of one person may be im-
puted to another, they must stand in such relation of privity
that the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se directly ap-
plies. In other words, before the concurrent negligence of
a third person can be interposed to shield another whose
neglect of duty has occasioned an injury to one who was
without personal fault, it must appear that the person in-
jured and the one whose negligence contributed to the injury
sustained such a relation to each other in respect to the mat-
ter then in progress, as that, in contemplation of law, the
negligent act of the third person was upon the principles of
agency or co-operation in the common or joint enterprise the
act of the person injured."
'Small v. Chicago R. Co. (1881), 55 Ia. 582, 8 N. W. 437; Kopletz v.
St. Paul (1902), 86 Minn. 573, 90 N. W. 794; Mott v. Hudson River R. Co.
(1861), 21 N. Y. Super. 345; Chicago Union Tract Co. v. Leach (1904),
117 Ill. App. 169; Simonds v. N. Y. Ry. Co. (1884), 52 Conn. 264, 52 Am.
Rep. 587; Richmond v. Va. Bonded Warehouse Corp. (1927), 148 Va. 60,
138 S. E. 503.
Contra, Kneeshaw v. Detroit United Ry. Co. (1912), 169 Mich. 697, 135
N. W. 903; Granger v. Farrant (1914), 179 Mich. 19, 146 N. W. 218; Jewel
v. Rogers (1919), 208 Mich. 318, 175 N. W. 151; Gates v. Landon (1921),
216 Mich. 417, 185 N. W. 723.
'1 Cyc. OF AUT0MOBILE LAW 1000.
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However, the courts, with the exception of the Texas courts,
have uniformly held that where persons are engaged in a com-
mon enterprise in the use of an automobile, and one of them is
injured while so engaged in such enterprise by the concurrent
negligence of a third person and the driver, the negligence of the
driver will bar a recovery for such injury against the third per-
son.3 Where persons are associated together in the execution of
a common purpose or undertaking, it is held that each is the
agent of the other in carrying out their plans, so that the negli-
gence of one is attributable to the other. This doctrine seems
to have been rejected by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 4
the court saying:
"We know of no authority for such a proposition of law,
and appellant has cited none."
Of course, the question always arises in such a case as to
whether the parties were actually engaged in a joint enterprise.
This question in many cases is very hard to determine. Berry5
says:
"The test in determining the question is whether the per-
sons were jointly operating or controlling the movements of
the vehicle in which they were riding."
Now let us assume an entirely different set of facts. Instead
of the passenger suing a negligent third person, he sues the neg-
ligent driver. Has he a cause of action against him?
The authorities are in accord with the proposition that
ordinarily when the occupant of an automobile is injured
through the operation of the machine, and it is shown that the
driver was negligent, and that the occupant was not guilty of
contributory negligence, the latter can maintain an action
against the driver and recover compensation for his injury.6
'Tannehill v. K. C. C. and S. R. Co. (1919), 279 Mo. 158, 213 S. W. 818;
Hanser v. Youngs (1920), 212 Mich. 508, 180 N. W. 409; Beaucage v. Mer-
cer (1910), 206 Mass. 492, 92 N. E. 774; Meyers v. So. Pac. Co. (Cal.,
1923), 218 P. 284.
'K. C. M. and 0. Ry. Co. v. Durrett (Tex., 1916), 187 S. W. 427.
'Berry, AUToMoBILEs, p. 502.
'Huddy, AUTOMOBILES, 5th Ed., Sec. 678; Blashfield, CYC. OF AUTOMOBILE
LAW, p. 1483; Hemington v. Hemington (1922), 221 Mich. 206, 190 N. W.
683; Mayberry v. Sivey (1877), 18 Kans. 291; Clay v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.(1928), 5 S. W. (2d) 409.
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But suppose the passenger and the driver of an automobile
are engaged in a joint enterprise. Can the passenger sue the
driver if the former sustains injury due to the negligence of the
latter? This is the problem to which this paper is addressed.
The digests and the text writers make the broad statement
that if the passenger and driver are engaged in a joint or com-
mon enterprise, and if the passenger is injured due to the negli-
gence of the driver, the negligence of the driver is imputed to
the passenger so as to bar recovery. If this statement is to be
taken literally, then the answer to our question would be that the
negligence of the driver would be imputed to his passenger, and
the passenger barred from recovery against the driver.
Huddy,7 says:
"It may be stated as a general rule that when the driver
and an occupant of a motor vehicle are engaged in a com-
mon purpose or joint enterprise, the negligence of the driver
may be imputed to the occupant. If they are so engaged and
the driver is negligent, the occupant may be precluded from
recovery for his injuries either from the driver or a third
person."
Such a proposition of law is not and cannot be based upon
any reasonable, logical or justifiable grounds.
In going through the decided cases, one will find very few
decisions on this point; in fact, most of our courts and text
writers have failed to see that there was a distinction between
the case where the passenger sues a negligent driver, and where
he sues a co-negligent third party. Most of our courts and
writers make no distinction between the two cases, but lump
them together under one general statement. The law on the
question as to the liability of a driver to his passenger when
both are engaged in a common enterprise, is in a period of for-
mation, and the courts should, if an analysis is properly made of
the case, draw a distinction between the two types of cases.
Let us take a typical example: Suppose A and B decide to
buy an automobile and drive from St. Louis to Los Angeles;
each has a one-half interest in the car and they agreed to split
the expenses of the trip. It is agreed that each is to do part
of the driving. Suppose A is driving, and due to his negligence
'Huddy, AuTomOBILES, Sec. 811.
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B is injured without any fault on his part. Has B a cause of
action against A?
Of course, we must first determine whether the parties were
engaged in a joint enterprise. If it could be said that these
parties were not engaged in a joint or common enterprise, then
there is no question that the negligence of A would not be im-
puted to B so as to bar B's recovery against A. This already
has been pointed out.
But assuming that A and B were engaged in a joint enter-
prise, is it proper in such case to say that A's negligence is to be
imputed to B so as to bar recovery by B? The writer believes
that it should not.
In Wilmes v. Fournier," plaintiff had asked defendant to go
on a deer hunt with several other men. The defendant con-
sented and plaintiff and defendant, together with two others,
started out in defendant's car on this deer hunt. While on their
trip the plaintiff was injured, due to the negligence of the de-
fendant. Plaintiff sued for his injuries and verdict was rendered
in his favor, defendant appealing. The contention of the de-
fendant was that these men were engaged in a joint enterprise,
and, therefore, that the negligence of the defendant was to be
imputed to the plaintiff so as to bar recovery. The court in a
very forceful and emphatic opinion, answers defendant in this
way:
"In every case cited by counsel upon the question of
whether there existed in the instant case a joint adventure
or enterprise, the action was an action against a third party,
and the question of whether the plaintiff was at the time of
the accident complained of engaged in a joint enterprise
was important only as it affected the liability of the plaintiff
for the negligence of his companion or companions; that
is, the case turned upon the question of imputed contribu-
tory negligence. . . . No case has been cited by counsel
in which one person concededly engaged in a common en-
terprise has sought to maintain an action against one of
his associates. The fact whether there is a joint enterprise
is one of importance in the class of cases cited, when the
action is against a third person; but as between themselves,
I know of no rule of law that throws a mantle of protection
over the tortious acts of an associate in a joint enterprise
£ (1920), 111 Misc. Rep. 9, 180 N. Y. S. 860, Aff'd 185 N. Y. S. 958.
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or in a partnership. Suppose one person assaulted his co-
partner; shall the wrong-doer be immune from liability be-
cause they were engaged at the time of the assault in the
partnership business? Suppose that while engaged in the
partnership business, one party conducts himself so care-
lessly as, except for such partnership relations, would give
a right of action; is the wrong-doer not liable to the injured
partner? True, they are, in a sense, each acting as agent
for the other, but does not one agent owe the duty of care
towards his principal and a principal towards his agent?
"A joint enterprise or partnership is not for the purpose
of permitting one of the parties thereto to commit a tort
upon his associates. Suppose this hunting party had
reached its destination and a member of the party had care-
lessly shot one of his associates. Would the fact that they,
to some extent, were engaged in a common enterprise render
the defendant sued for the shooting immune? I think not.
Motion for new trial denied."
The New York court's reasons seem to be logical and reason-
able.
However, in Illinois one of the courts seems to have taken
exactly a contrary position in Barnett v. Levy. The Illinois
court did not make the distinction which should properly be made
between the two types of cases, as made by the New York court.
The action was brought by the occupant of an automobile against
the owner, for injuries alleged to have been caused by the lat-
ter's negligent operation of the car. Defendant was the owner
of the automobile; the plaintiff and defendant and two others
had agreed to take a trip to New York and to divide the ex-
penses among them; the plaintiff was agreed upon as cashier,
and he paid all the expenses incurred during the trip, including
the hotel bills, meals, gasoline, and oil, up to the time of the
accident. Due to the negligence of the defendant, the driver,
the plaintiff was injured. Defendant contended that plaintiff
and himself were engaged in a joint enterprise, and that his
negligence was to be imputed to the plaintiff so as to bar re-
covery. The court instructed the jury that if the persons riding
in the automobile were engaged at the time of the accident in a
joint enterprise, and each of them had agreed to pay one-fourth
f the expenses of the trip, then the plaintiff could not recover.
(1919), 213 Ill. App. 129.
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Judgment was rendered for the defendant, and the plaintiff ap-
pealed. The upper court held:
"The authorities are numerous that where two persons
sustain personal injuries while engaged in a joint enter-
prise, if the negligence of one of them proximately con-
tributed to the accident, then such negligence becomes a bar
to an action brought by the other against a third person for
such injuries. Judgment affirmed."
Obviously, the court failed to recognize that this action was
not brought against a third person, but was brought against
a joint adventurer. It seems to the writer that the lower court's
instruction was erroneous.
However, a case which came to the appellate court of Illinois
sometime later seems to overrule Barnett v. Levy in its dictum.
In Lasley v. Crawford,1° the defendant asked the decedent to ac-
company him in the defendant's automobile in order to get a
large car to go riding, and while riding with defendant the de-
cedent was killed in an accident due to the negligence of the
defendant. This action was brought for damages. Judgment
was for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed, contending
that as he and the decedent were engaged in a joint enterprise,
his negligence was to be imputed to the decedent as to bar re-
covery. The court held that the parties were not engaged in a
joint enterprise, and, therefore, that the negligence of the driver
could not be imputed to his guest. By way of dictum, the court
said:
"And we do not think that there is any merit in counsel's
further contention that plaintiff cannot recover against
Crawford because at the time of the accident defendant and
the decedent were engaged in a joint enterprise."
The court cited Wilmes v. Fournier, supra, but did not allude
to Barnett -v. Levy, supra. In the case of Roy v. Kirn,11 there is
dictum to the effect that one joint adventurer is liable to the
other if the former is negligent. In this case the plaintiff was
a guest in the defendant's automobile, and due to defendant's
negligence sustained injuries. The appellate court in affirming
judgment for the plaintiff says:
" (1923), 228 Ill. App. 590.
' (1919), 208 Mich. 571, 175 N. W. 475.
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"There is no claim here that any negligence of the defend-
ant would be imputable to the plaintiff. This is not an
action against other parties, but against the driver of the
automobile."
It can be seen that this Michigan court recognizes that a dis-
tinction must be drawn between the case where one engaged in
a joint enterprise sues his joint adventurer for negligence, and
the case where he sues a third party.
The digests disclose only one more case on this proposition.
In Bushnell v. Bushnell, 2 the plaintiff was riding in an automo-
bile with her husband and was injured due to his negligence.
She brought an action to recover for personal injuries. One of
the defendant's contentions was that the parties were engaged
in a joint enterprise at the time of the injury, that therefore his
negligence was to be imputed to her, and that she was thus guilty
of contributory negligence so as to bar recovery. Judgment was
rendered for the plaintiff, however, and on appeal the court, in
discussing the question of joint enterprise, says:
"It is generally agreed that, if two persons are engaged
jointly in a common enterprise requiring for its purpose
that they use and occupy a conveyance of some sort-a
wagon, boat or other vehicle-in the management and con-
trol of which both have equal authority and rights, each as-
sumes a responsibility for his colleague's conduct; and, if
either is injured by the negligence of a third party and the
concurring negligence of his companion, the mere fact that
he was not at the time driving the common conveyance will
not enable him to recover of the wrong-doer. . . . He,
who, in the process of a joint enterprise, is engaged in oper-
ating a vehicle, represents in so doing, all who are associated
with him in that enterprise, and if he is negligent, any one
of them may look to him for damages upon the same basis
as that upon which a principal holds that agent liable for
his negligent conduct. However it might have been, were
the plaintiff suing the third party for injuries due to his
negligence concurrent with that of her husband, here, where
she was charging him with responsibility for injuries due
to his own failure in duty, there was no place for any im-
putation of his want of care to her, and the sole issues were
those having to do with his negligence and her own con-
tributorr negligence. The doctrine of joint enterprise was
wholly inapplicable to such a situation."
"(1925), 103 Conn. 583, 131 A. 432.
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Let us draw an analogous case. Suppose A and B are co-
servants engaged in a joint enterprise and working for C. Sup-
pose A is injured due to the negligence of B while in the course
of such employment. Our courts have always held that merely
because the individuals involved were engaged in joint or com-
mon purpose, negligence of one is not to be imputed to the other
so as to bar recovery. In the case of Brower v. Northern Pacific
Railway Company,13 the plaintiff sued the Northern Pacific Rail-
way Company and one Klovstadt for personal injuries caused
by the negligence of the defendants. The plaintiff and Klovstadt
were fellow-servants working for the defendant Railway Com-
pany. Klovstadt contended that as he was a fellow-servant, he
could not be held liable, but the lower court overruled Klovstadt's
demurrer. On this point, the upper court said on appeal:
"Whether a negligent servant is liable in an action for
damages by another servant in the employ of the same
master depends upon the common law obligation to so con-
duct himself as to not cause injury to another, and does not
rest upon any duty imposed by privity of contract."
In another case, Griffiths v. Wolfram,1 4 the court in a very
clear opinion says that the mere fact that two men are working
together in a joint enterprise does not excuse one if he acts care-
lessly towards the other. In this case, the plaintiff was work-
ing with defendants in erecting a machine shop, and was in-
jured due to the defendants' carelessness. The court held that
"The liability of defendants does not rest upon any duty
imposed by privity of contract, for in such cases there may
not be and frequently is not any such privity. But the duty
of each to do the work with proper care grew out of the
relation which existed between them as persons engaged in
the same work; for where several persons are engaged in
the same work, in which the negligent and unskilful per-
formance of his part by one may cause danger to the others,
in which each must necessarily depend for his safety upon
the good faith, skill and prudence of each of the others in
doing his part of the work, then it is the duty of each of the
others engaged in the work to exercise the care and skill
ordinarily employed by prudent men in similar circum-
stances."
(1910), 109 Minn. 385, 124 N. W. 10.(1875), 22 Minn. 185.
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In Atkins v. Field,'5 the plaintiff and defendant were in the
common employ of the United States government in construct-
ing a battery. Due to the negligence of the defendant in han-
dling a mast, the plaintiff received personal injuries, for which he
sued. Judgment was for plaintiff in the lower court. The de-
fendant appealed, contending that he was only a co-servant with
the plaintiff under a common master, the United States govern-
ment; that both were taking orders from a common superior;
that the duty of furnishing safe machinery and appliances was
upon the government, the common employer, acting through the
officer in charge; and that all he (the defendant) did in setting
up the derrick was done as an employee under the supervision
of, and with the approval of, that officer. He argued that this
approval by his superior relieved him from any responsibility
therefor to his fellow servants. The upper court, in affirming
judgment for the plaintiff, stated that an employee is responsible
to a co-employee for injuries caused by his negligence in the line
of his duty to the common employer.
In the case of Cameron v. Nystrom,6 the defendant was a
stevedore employed in discharging a vessel. The ship furnished
the gear, but the stevedore set it up. This was done so negli-
gently that a part of the gear broke, letting fall a coil of wire on
the plaintiff, a seaman on the same ship, to his injury. It was
argued that the plaintiff and defendants were co-servants and,
therefore, that the defendant should not be held liable to the
plaintiff. The court held this to be no defense, as the defendant
was responsible to the plaintiff for the defendant's negligence
in setting up the gear.
In Osborne v. Morgan,17 the plaintiff and defendant were co-
servants. Due to the negligence of the defendant, plaintiff was
injured. On the question of whether a co-servant is liable for his
negligence to this fellow employee, the court says:
"One servant is liable to an action by another servant in
the employment of the same master for damages occasioned
by the negligence of the first in such employment. . .
The plaintiff's action is an action of tort for injuries which,
(1896), 89 Me. 281, 36 A. 375.
[1893], A. C. 308.
2 (1881), 130 Mass. 102, 39 Am. Rep. 437.
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according to the common experience of mankind, was a
natural consequence of defendant's negligence."
Our digests are full of cases which say that one negligent
servant is liable to his co-servant, providing, of course, that there
is no contributory negligence, and this notwithstanding the fact
that both may be doing the same work in a joina enterprise.
In legal contemplation there should not be any distinction drawn
between a case where the parties engaged in the joint enterprise
that both may be doing the same work in a joint enterprise.
are fellow servants and a case where the parties are not fellow
servants but yet are engaged in a joint or common purpose.
The mere fact that the parties are engaged in a common or
joint enterprise should not bar recovery by one of them against
the other if the latter be negligent in the doing of a certain
act. Such a position is based upon reason and logic, and the
writer sees no soundness to the proposition that merely because
the parties are engaged in a common enterprise, or doing an act
for their common good, one may be as negligent as he likes to-
wards the other, and yet not suffer the consequences of any dam-
age the latter may sustain as a result of such negligence.
It is hoped that the general proposition of law applied by the
Illinois court in Barnett v. Levy, supra, will not be hardened
into a precedent which courts will follow blindly.
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